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FIRE INSURANCE RATING
Chapter I
EARLY HISTORY OF FIRE INSURANCE RATING
Fire insurance may "be defined as that agency which is de-
signed to collect certain stipulated sums of money from each
of a large group of individuals in return for which these
individuals receive protection from all direct losses caused
hy fires during a certain perxod. By direct losses is meant
only those losses involving real and personal property. In
other words, the function of fire insurance is to distrihute
fire losses equitably. An equitable distribution means that
each individual, each property group, each community, each
state, may during each year justly claim relief from an ex-
cessive burden of fire destruction.
It is questionable how the individual or even the city
could endure, without insurance, such severe losses as the
Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, or San Francisco conflagrations.
Modern business undert sJcings which are based largely on
credit could not safely be carried on without the protection
afforded by fire insurance. Capitalists loan sums of money
on buildings far in excess of the land value because they know
that with the ihsurance policy as collateral the security is
safe. The merchant, who is a large employer of credit, could
not afford to sell goods to the consumer on as small a margin
of profit as he does, if he had to assume all of the risk of
his stock being burned.
3i8i.71

EThe first fire insurance comp.^nies"^ dates "back to the period ^
immediately following the great London fire in 1666* They were
organized hy Barhon aad Poyey, two English traders. The former
would assume liability on the huilding only, while the latter
insured "both the huilding and contents. E.:.rly rates on buildings
were based on their rental value and mode of construction. The .
contents were insured at the same rate as the building until 1714,
when an advance on the contents' rate was made by the Union Fire
Office of London. From the very beginning it was realized that
wooden buildings were more hazardous than brick and stone build-
ings. Evidence of this fact is apparent in Barbon's tables of
1681, in which the former were rated almost twice as high as the
latter. Term insurance was introduced at this early date also,
a majority of the policies being written for a period of seven,
fourteen, or twenty-one years.
In 1720, when the Royal Exchange and the London Assurance
were incorporated, the practice of publishing prospectuses-'- had
become established. The Royal Exchange stated that it would in-
sure "any college hall, house or any other building, and all
goods, wares and merchandise contained therein to their full value,
except notes, bills, tallies and books". The rate for brick and
stone buildings and contents was five shillings for every £250;
for timber, plaster, and thatched buildings the rate was eight
shillings. However, if the sum insured exceeded £1500, an ad-
vance over the rates quoted above went into effect, the brick and
stone buildings being rated at seven shillings, six pence per
£150, and the timber, plaster, and ths'tched buildings at twelve
1.Modern Business Series, Vol. Z, - p. 115.

3shillings per £150. This practice of increasing the rate
premium when the amount insured passed a certain sum lasted until
1848 in Great Britain, hut never secured much of a foothold in
this country.
Ahout this time (1720)^ the insurance companies hegan to
classify trad® and vocations on the basis of the hazards present
in each undertaking. Breweries, distilleries, chemical lah oratories,
and powder factories were charged a higher rate than the average
industrial f<i.ctory. Under this early classification, risks were
divided into two large classes, common and hazardous. Those risks
which were classed in the first group were sub-divided into
common and half-hazardous. The hazardous group was divided into
hazardous, one-half-douhly-hazardous, and doubly-hazardous.
The first insurance company in this country was organized
at Charleston, South Carolina in December 1735. The company
operated on the mutual plan, and was known as the Friendly
Society. Six years after the date of organization, the company
incurred a loss of ^1250 in a fire and as a result ceased business.
The Philadelphia Contributionship Company^ was organized in
1752 under a Pennsylvania charter. This company insured houses
for a minimum terra of seven years. If brick, the charge was
twenty shillings for each LlOO of insurance, and if frame, the
charge was sixty shillings for each ilOO, A short time after the
organization of this company an additional charge was made on all
houses having trees in front of them.
As a result of this increase in rate, the Green Tree Company
was formed. This company established two sets of rates, one for
1. Modern Business Series, Vol. Z - p. 116.
2. Spectator, December 31, 1914.
3. Modem Business Series, Vol. X - p. 117.

4houses having no trees in front, and the second, somewhat higher
houses
than the first, for/having trees in the same lot. At this early-
time one can see that the result of raising the rates was the
direct cause of the formation of the new company, thereby in-
crea:-ing competition.
In 1797 the Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Boston made an
extensive research"^ into the statistics covering the nurnher of
"buildings destroyed by fire for a period of 38 years, and found
that the loss was ahout 18% per annum, in other words ahout one
building in five was destroyed each year. „^
Probably the first instance of rating by schedule was in
2
England in 1848. In that year a schedule simiLdr to modern
schedules was devised to apply to v/oolen mills. From that time
until the present various forms of tariffs have been in use,
generally applying to the whole of Great Britain, although
occasionally only to p:irts.
The early tariffs in this country were formed largely
by duplicating the English schedules, with slight modifications
to meet new conditions found here. The various risks were grouped
into classes, the number of classes Vc^rying in different p^.rts of
the country. As an illustration, in one section buildings were
divided into six different classes, the rate of a building in
the first being 25 cents, in the second 37i- cents, third 40 cents, I
fourtlp
. 42^ cents, fifth 45 cents, and sixth 50 cents. In this
same sectioh the rate on contents was determined by the classifi-
cation of the contents. The not-hazardous group consisted of
coffee, household furniture, linens and paints ground in oil. In
1. Modern Series Business, Vol. VI - p. 116
2. ibid,
3. ibid, - p,118

5the nazardous group chinaware, plate glass, cotton bales, and. fire
ciasEers were listed. The extra-hazardous v;as composed of
apothecaries' supplies, fur dresses, and printing supplies. The
specially-hazardous group was made of "barbers' supplies, gas makers'
supplies and the contents of large manufacturing risks.
1 n .
The national Board of Fire Underv/riters was organized m
1866. The object was to regulate rates and commissions throughout
the entire country. A large fire on July 4, 1866 at Portland, Maine,
involving a loss of about ^aO, 000, 000 lent a great impetus to the
movement for a national rating system. The Board undertook to
determine the rates for the entire country by working through
special organizations in the various states, end with the assistance
of the agents of the various companies. Wox the first few years
the work was very successful, but by 1871 it had begun to decline.
In this year the great Chicago fire lent a new impetus to the
movement, which was further strengti. ened the following ye air by
the Boston fire. The success of national rating was rather
short-lived, and was soon abajidoned as impracticable. The Board
is still in existence and its membership embraces 124 of the lead-
ing companies. Its chief function now is educational, although
to a certain extent it exerts a general influence toward uniformity
and better practices in the business. It is the representative
body which acts for the underwriters in matters of general im-
portance to the companies and to the public.
After the failure of the National Board in the rating problem,
loc;.l organizations assumed this function. These were composed of
representatives of the companies, who were f.amiliar with local con-
ditions in the different communities. The territory each covered
1. Modern Business Series Vol. X. - p. 121.

varied in extent from a small city in some instances to several
states. It was during this period that rating "by schedule hegijji
to come into general prominence, hut as each district was rated
ty different men, the rates were not uniform. In order to put
rating on as nearly a uniform basis in all p^.rts of the country
as possible, Mr. F. C. Moore originated the idea of a Universal
L'ercantile Schedule.
This schedule^ was designed by a committee of 37 underwriters
selected from the New England Insurance Exchange, the Underwriters*
Association of New York State, Underwriters' Association of the
Middle Department, the South East Tariff Association, the National
Board of Fire Underwriters, and the Kew York Board of Fire Under-
writers. This schedule combined the judgment of the largest
number of underwriters ever consulted on the subject of rating. It
was conceded^ that the tariff was not perfect and that it would
be improved from year to year.
The preparation occupied the constant labor of the committee
for a period of nearly two years. ^ Six successive proofs were
issued and each criticized by underwriters in the United States,
Canada and England. At the beginning the Committee attempted to
formulate a short form, but they soon became convinced that the
subject was too 1 .rge to be treated in this manner, and that,
in order to leave as little as possible to the judgment of the
rater and to recognize every feature of the risk, a form
embracing great detc-il was necessary.
The schedule is based on the following:- standard of en-
vironment - city;^ standard of construction - building; addition
1. Moore, Fire Insurance and How to Building - 182.
2. ibid - p. 705
3. ibid - p. 702
4. ibid - p. 631

7of specific ch-:^rges for ignitibility and combustible features of
occupancy; deductions on both building c.nd content for exceptional
features of fire protection.
The standu^rd city was described in minute detail as one
having gravity waterworl^s, with a pressure sufficient at all times
to throw a streem of water over a fi^e-story building; the main
supply pipe was to be in duplicate unless intemediate reservoirs
were provided; the v/ater pipes v/ere to be at least six inches
in diameter; a paid fire department composed of at least twelve
men to each steamer; not less than two ste.umers to each square
mile of congested districts or one to each 10,000 population up
to 500,000; a hook and ladder truck to every four steamers;
telegraphic fire alarm; efficient police department; good
streets, 60% of which were to be 70 feet or more in width; a
good building law; no outlying exposures; no unjust municipal
and state taxation; and a previous five ye<^r fire record not
exceeding i^S.OO per yearly fire loss to each iiplOOO of insurance.
The standard building was described as one h:.ving brick or
stone walls not less thfm twelve inches at the top story and ex-
tending through and rising at least 26 inches above the roof,
and copped and increasing 4 inches in thickness far each story
below to the ground, the incre.xed thicloaess to be utilized for
beam ledges; area of ground floor not over 2500 square feet;
height not over four stories or 50 feet; floors of 2 inches plank
covered with 7/8 inch flooring crossing diagonally with water-
proof paper or approved fire resisting materi^ul between; wooden
beam girders and wooden story posts or pillars at least 12 inches
thick or protected iron columns; elevators and other passageways

8between floors cut off "by "brick walls or "by plaster or metallic
studs and lathing; all comi-nunicat ions protected by approved tin
covered doors and fire proof sills; exposed windows and doors
protected by tin covered doors and shutters; walls of flues not
less thant 8 inches in thickness, lined with fire brick and having
a throat capacity net less than 96 square inches if steam boilers
were used; steam heat; gas lights; cornices of incombustible
material; roof of metal or tile; hollow walls or partitions to
have a fire stop at each door. Providing all these conditions
had been complied with the committee fixed the r^tte on such a
building in such a city at 25 cents per ^100.
1
Contents were rated according to their susceptibility to
damage. The committee believed that simil-^r buildings and con-
tents in similar cities should huve the same rate; tha,t the risk
sho-ald not be rated on construction alone, but that the fire
fighting facilities of the city or town should be considered;
that credit for fire fighting appliances, especially water, should
not be the same in computing the rate on contents as on the
building rate because water damages contents to a gre...ter extent
thcjR it does buildings. The rate on a stock of goods should
approach that of the building cortaining it in the proportion
that the latter is of poor construction and li.-ble to be totally
destroyed, and as it is deficient in fire extinguishing appliances.
The schedule was formed so that it could be applied to any
toYm or city. If local underwriters deemed the rates too high
or too low and should insist o.n raising or lo?;ering them, all
that was necessary was to raise or lower the final rates by the
1. Moore, Fire Insurance and How to Build - p. 185.

9percentage needed to adjust them to the local under-
writers' own ideas. If it was necessary to reduce rates
in order to meet competition, the percentage method
was recommended. It was advised that the rates should nervex
he thrown open to competition, because the histoiy of the
fire insurance "business shows, that whenever rates have
"been thrown open, it has heen difficult afterwards to
raise them, and that they generally, if not invariahly
readjust themselves upon some level lower than that from which
they fell*
At first glance the schedule may seem too complex, hut
1
the concensus of opinion among hundreds of experts is that
it is consistent, and thit the charges and deductions
are as relatively correct as it is possible to make them.
The entire schedule really embraces four distinct parts; the
city schedule, the non-fire proof schedule, the fire proof
schedule, and the warehouse schedule. In making this
schedule, the makers wished to reduce the conflagrations,
both in number and amount of loss, to place a premium on
better building construction, confine internal fires to
single floors, and to make rates uniform to all. V/hether
or not this schedule is correct in principle will be determined
later; that it is being used in many of our cities shows
that it is far better than any previous i:ariff
•
1, Moore, Fire Insurance and how to Build - p. 625.
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The Dean schedule is another method of schedule rating
which has gained great respect from undervi' ^r-iters "the
middle west. It differs from the Moore schedule in more than
one essential point.
All cities, towns, and villages in a certain area &re
divided into six classes dependent on the degree of fire pro-
tection afforded hy each. As a starting point an ordinary one-
story hrick "building situated in a tovm of the sixth or lowest
class is chosen. The "base rate of this building is determined
"by raters or underwriters who have had sufficient experience
in the comrauni y to know the approximate loss record. Mr.
Desn furnishes a numher of hasis rate tables of which the follow-
ing is an exaraple of one used in which the base rate is 60
1
c ent s •
Height 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
class class class class class class
1 story 33 37 4E 47 57 60
E Story 34 39 44 49 59 63
S Story 36 40 46 5E 6E 66
4 Story 38 43 49 55 66 70
5 Story 41 47 53
6 Story 46
Increase for
additional
story 07 07 07 07 07 07
Decrease for
no basement OE OE OE OE 03 03
Because a building of ordinary construction is cJi©sen,
there will be fewer charges and deductions necessary in the
final caluclation of the rate under this schedule than under
1. Huebner, Property Insurance - p. 203.
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the "Universal." Instead of fixed or absolute amounts to "be
added to or deducted from the base rate on account of deficiencies
or improvements, the Dean schedule uses the percentage method of
charges and deductions. -If a change in the final rate is deemed
necessary this change is affected hy a change in the base rate, the
relativity of the specific charges and deductions always remaining
the s^me. For esraraple, :an open stairway in a two story building
is not as dangerous as one in a five story building.. Under the
Universal, however, a fixed amount would be charged in both cases,
while under the Dean schedule the two story building would be
charged say 1% of the base r;.te which let it be assumed is ^1*00
or 1 cent, and in the case of the five story building with a base
rate of l.EO the charge would be 1.2 cents.
The occupancy charge under the Dean schedule is calculated
from two points of view. Pirst the particular occupancy is viewed
from the standpoint of the tendency which its presence to cause
a fire creates. Second, the combustibility or extent to which the
contents are likely to aid the spread or intensity of a fire are
cor.sidered. These charges are in percentages of the base rate of
the building, and the sum of the base rate plus the charges for
deficiencies minus the credits for protective features plus the
occupancy rate give the "occupied rate of the building."
The rate on the contents is calculated from the point of
view of the dcianage ability to the goods; that is to say the extent
to which the goods are likely to be injured by the effects of
fire, such as smoke, wuter and heat, i'he base rate of the
building and the location of the contents, v/hether on the first,
second, or third floor, also plays a pcirt in the final makeup of

12
the contents' rate. Separate schedules are used for contents in
hrick and frame buildings.
One of the most important fecitures"^of the Dean schedule
is the exposure formula. The exposure hazard is dependent on
the construction of the buildings, the distances between risks
which affect each other, and the amount of fire department
protection available in case of a fire. Dean classifies external
exposures under three heads.
"Radiated exposure, consisting of the proportion of the
building's own hazard which it radiates toward exposed
risks.
Absorbed exposure, consisting of the proportion of radiated
hazard absorbed by an exposed risk.
Transmitted exposiire, or proportion of hazard a risk
absorbs from one side, that is transmitted by it to a risk
on the other side."
1. Huebner, Property Insurance - p. E05.
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Chapter II
SCEEDULE RATIIJG
That the fire loss in this country should he diminished
is not questioned. A comparison of our fire losses with those of
European countries brings us to the realization that we are
extremely wasteful. In France the fire loss is ^.33 per capita,
in the United States i^2.M,^ Other European countries have a
proportionately low ratio. The cause for this is not in the
methods of fire fighting, because the average American fire
department is far superior in efficiency to any department siipport-
ed by European cities. Some cause for the gre^-t difference in loss
ratios may be due to the scarcity of wood for building pi;-rposes
in European countries as compared with the use of this material
in our country. Then too the European is more careful than
the average /imerican, this being especially true in France,
where a law is in force which places the responsibility of fires
spreading from one building to another on the one where the fire
originates. There is no doubt but that our fire loss must be
reduced, and one of the principal agencies through which this can
be done is rating by schedule.
As an agency for the prevention of fires, rating by
schedule takes precedence. With schedule rating the insured
is enabled to see why his rate is what it is, and the agent is
more than pleased to tell him how this same rate may be reduced
and the danger of fire greatly lessened. It is this promotion
1. Zartman, Yale Reading in Fire Insurance - p. f
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of good "building construction that makes schedule rating such
an important factor in lowering our fire waste. Of course,
the makers should always have in mind that a premium for good
building construction should he incorporated in every schedule
so that the insured will feel fully recompensed for making any
changes for the "betterment of his risk that may lessen the
hazard and thereby reduce the premium.
A further benefit of schedule rating can be observed by
the rise in the burning ratio v/hich tends to follow a period
of rate demoralization. To illustrate, the following figures
are submitted:-
St. Louis Business 1877-1881-^
Premium Losses Expenses
1877 #1,0£6,657 §869,827 #279,863
1878 97Q,023 463,054 358,908
1879 1,015,005 960,503 375,922
1880 1,362,293 955,044 504,048
1881 1,392.865 1,326,348 515,550
^5,767,843 v 4,574;776 p,134;051
Fire loss ratio 79.3%
Expense ratio 37^
The St. Louis Board of Underwtiters was organized in 1872,
its purpose being to make and maintain adequate rates. At the
beginriing no attempt v/as made at systematic rating the old
method of flat rates being employed. After several years, however,
a schedule was devised by Messrs. Western Bascome and Jolm H«
Fairchild and was put into effect in the fall of 1875. Luring the
time that the schedule was being prepared non-board competition
1, Wat^rworth, Cost of Fire Insurance in the city of St.
Louis.
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was very strong and unscrupulous. The one universal and intelligerfc
non-board rule was "first find out the Board rate; then cut it"
This rule has he en found good for New York and Chicago as well
as St. Louis. This competition played havoc with the business.
The new schedule was cast aside and flat rates brought into use
again to meet this "cut throat" competition. R. tes went down
until there was no money in the business. The experience of
1877 was disastrous. In December 1879 a majority of the Kion-Board-
ers joined the Board but there was still enough of the K.on-
Boarders left that rate cutting continued. In 1880 and 1881 losses
were excessive. In September 1881 after a season of unparalell
loss St. Louis faaed the crisis of either raising her fire in-
surance rates or of being without insurance. The evil of these
disastrous years from the companies poiiit of view v/as the in-
adequacy of the rates to meet local conditions. As a result the
Schedule was revised, the charges being raised and St. Louis was
forced to pay extra large premiums for the years following in
order to make up for the cheap insurance that she had enjoyed
during the period of rate cutting*
Business men who v/ant lower fire insurance rates should
profit by the lesson recently taught a number of merchants at
Canton, Illinois.-^ These men h^^d their rt.tes reduced almost half
because they forced the removal of a frame building which stood
directly in the rear of four brick buildings so situated that it
was practically certain that a fire starting in one would be
communicated to all of the others. As a direct result of this
removal two of the buildings had their rates reduced 55.4% and
1. Lov/er Fire Insurance Rates {circular printed by Business
men of Canton, Illinois).
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65.2% and the other two 39.5% while the reduction on the contents
was within 7% or 8% of the reduction on the "buildings.
Another advantage of schedule rating is that it is consistent
and ecuitahle, thus reducing discrimination between the man with
influence and the man without.
Probahly the greatest example that shows what schedule rating
is capable of doing is in the work done "by the factory mutuals.
Stock companies have attempted to make the rate fit the hazards
while the mutuals have sought to eliminate the dangerous hazards
with the aim of preventing loss. They have used the principle
that the proper way to control the fire hazard is to study
the causes of fires, not in order to charge each risk for its
specific hazard, hut to eliminate these hazards. In this way
every fire that has taken place has "been analyzed and studied with
the motive in mind of devising remedies that will prevent a re-
currence of such loss. That they have "been successful would "be a
poor way of expressing it. From 1860 to 1910''" the rates have de-
creased from 40 cents to 4 l/3 cents the average for the period
"being 12 cents. They have written a total amount of insurance
of 6 80, 000, 000 and hcve paid v3, 118, 000 in losses. During the
life of the Arkwright company no assessment has ever been levied
ctnd all of the mutuals have returned an average of 84. 5^^ of the
original premium deposit. In 1910 the Arkwright people had
^270,000,000 at risk and was returning 94% of all premium deposits
•
When the mutuals first entered the field of fire insurance
the rates on factories were exorbitant. This was not caused by
discrimination, for the fire companies treated these risks the
1. Arkwri^nt, Fire Insurance Company ^liutual)
^ „
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same as they treated other risks, that is, they made the rate
fit the hazard and made no attempt to lessen the hazard'^hy
advising changes in construction or arrangement. Even these
rates often proved inadequate because the companies did not
have the necessary knowledge on which to base them. Losses became
so frequent that many stock companies withdrew from the factory
field, and it was difficult for the owners to get protection at
any rate. It was then that the factories began to organize
mutuals among themselves.
Because of the competition of the Mill Mutuals stock
companies have found it necessary to organize associations to
examine plants, prepare plans for sprinkler equipment and other
fire preventive devices, end provide for inspections to see that
they are properly installed. I'he result in the case of the stock
companies' associations has been the same as in the Mill
Mutuals, a very material drop in rates. At the present time the
stock companies can insure these risks at practically the same
price as the mutuals. Thit the stock companies have profited
of
by following in the steps^/the mutuals is true; but that they did
not see this means of lessening the fire loss but-had to have- some
one else point it out to them certainly does not reflect favor-
ably upon their business acumen.
That inequities in rates exist is not questioned, how to
remedy them ;md make them equitable is quite another matter. The
greatest h.;rra to equity is discrimination. Th-t is, ch...rging one
class a rate higher than the hazard warrants and allowing another
1. Zartman, Yale Readings in i'ire Insurance
2, Report of Special Legislative Committee Appointed to
Investigate Jire Insiirance Conditions - Kew York -1911
- p. 64.
•
^
'
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olass to 136 insured at a rate lower than the hazard warrants,
the companies figuring that the resultant would equalize the
difference. Now dwelling houses are classed as preferred risks.
As a rule the average valuation of each piece of property
is comparatively small, the premium is not large, and there is
no united pressure brought by the owners on the companies to
reduce the rate to the point where it should he. On the other
hand hazj^rdous risks as a rule cover large values and united
action on the part of the owners of similar risks is brought
to bear on the insurance companies, the result being that the
rate is lowered to a point below what their experience tells them
it ought to be. The most serious effect in cases similar to
the above is that since the rate is not proportional to the hazard
there is insufficient incentive to the insured to improve his
risk. Any underrating of hazardous risks is an econcraic
mistake. That there are preferred classes is unquestioned^
evidence oi this being seen in the excessive commissions paid to
agents for certain classes of business. Another evil effect of
discrimination is that certain companies c»ter to thie kind of
business and under the pretense of transacting fire insurance
business have confined themselves solely to these classes, the
result being small losses and excessive profits. In other words
they have secured the bream of the business* end left the balance
to the other companies.
The honest application of a schedule which has been formed
with each haz;ird carefully calculated eliminates all discrimination
and even if the schedule is not perfect, it adjusts rates properly
among a given class and thus eliminates discrimination among
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members of the same class. The whole object may be summed up
in the following: "reasonable equity is obtained so long as
personal favoritism is abolished, and every man accorded the
same charge or credit for the same item of hazard."
That there is a movement toward the ideal is apparent be-
cause dwelling house rates have been coming down for a number of
years and will come still lower if ti e public demands it. By
lowering these rates then rates on the more hazardous risks will
be compelled to seek a higher level.
In schedule rating there are three important elements that
must be recognized - const rue tinn, varying loss record in
different states and varying loss record from year to year.
Elements of construction are fairly well known and although not
entirely correct, yet as a general rule they are equitable and
free from discrimination. The element of place is not so well
known and established. It is true though that the loss record
increases as we go westward, ^ot instance out of twenty-two states
chosen at random eight east of Ohio had en average burning rate of
55 cents per $100 and fourteen west of Ohio had an average of
79 cents. ^ Materials of construction may cause some difference ^
but there must be other reasons for this increased waste. That
this difference has existed in the past is equally true because
an examination of early schedules show that the difference in
the burning rate of different states has been recognized and
provided for to a certain extent. In some tariffs the states had
a different base rate. In others charges and deductions were
chariged. The Universal recogni zed this difference by providing
1. Report of Special Legislative Committee appointed to
investigate Fire Insurance Conditions - Kew York -1911 p.®
2. Hess, Philosophy and Methods of Fire Rating -p. 8.
4
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a per cent age charge when the loss exceeded a certain amomit per
^100 and a reduction when the loss was less than a certain amount.
Any rating system then that is to conform to statistics of vary-
ing loss records in different localities must provide some
proper means of measuring this difference in burning rates.
The element of time is more difficult to understand and is
even less gener silly recognized that either of the preceding two.
The hazard does not change, neither does the general turning
rate relation. Nevertheless losses do change from year to year
according to no general law that has been discovered. For
several years records may show heavy losses in all localities
and on all classes of business. Then again during the next few
years the loss ratio may be very low. It times these fluctuations
may be accounted for by unusual weather conditions, of rain or
drought, at other times by increase or decrease of moral
hazard due to business depression or prosperity caused by the
1
weather and success or failure of crops. In one class it
ranged from 34 cents to 98 cents per $100 and back again in four
years; in another from 66 to |1.33 and then back to 70 cents;
in Y/isconsin it has ranged from 50 cents to ^1.19 in the last
twenty-one years, in Texas from 60 to ^1.30; lew York from 26 to
47. During the last eighteen years the burning rate of the entire
country has ranged from 50 to 78 cents exclusive of the San
Francisco disaster when it soared to .^1,17. The extremes do not
appear closely together, one period of five years showed an
average burning rate of 66 cents the period immediately following
57 cents. Any schedule to be permanent and adequate must not
ignore these fluctuations if it is to be equitable to all in-
1. Hess, Philosophy and Methods of Fire Rating - p. 11#
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surers.
In the United States the average rate has ranged from
$1 to ^1«25."^ All former schedules with the exception of the
Universal huve c. ntained no provision whatsoever for such changes.
If various years showed varying loss ratios the schedules were
either arhitrarily advanced or decreased. This caused much
complaint on the part of property owners and as a result the
average life of these schedules have only "been about five years.
A flat or percentage change is unpopular and only temporary at
a
the "best. ?or example, Milwaukee hegan rating under/specially
designed schedule in 1893. Tliree years later the Buffalo
Mercantile was suhst ituted, in 1901 ^^nother schedule took its
place and in 1906 the Dean was attempted. Before any new tariff
can "be applied there is almost sure to "be a rise or fall in the
wave of annual loss which makes the new rates either too lew or
too high. There is no assurance that when they become effective,
they will fit existing conditions.^ If the rates are too high
competition v/ill make it necessary to employ competitiv e rates
which from their very nature are out of alignment with the other
rates and as they multiply, all of the relativity ^s v/ell as
fairness in the tariffs are destroyed. Past history in the fire
insurance business has shown us that rates must be constantly
changing. '-7e cannot maintain them at an unvarying level because
the loss wave varies. One year the losses may be small, the year
following they may be large. No fixed law can be stated in
regard to them. The average loss for some past definite period
may be detemined, however, and it is this average that should be
1. Hess, Philosophy end Methods of Fire Rating - p. 14
2. ibid - p. 17
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used as a Taasis for the final rate, the final rate curve running
approximately par al ell with the loss curve.
The rater must realize that the rate is made up of a numher
of elements, that they are merely comparative. V/hen a hazard
is expressed numerically it is not the hazard itself hut its
relation to other hazards that is thus expressed. All of these
charges are numerical expressions of the relative amounts of
fire hazards in those features of the risk to which they
specifici-lly apply. Because fire hazards are hy nature a network
of relativity we must decide what kind of relativity they are.
All relations of fire hazards are relations of quantity.
These relations are coexistent such as difference in hazards
due to construction and differences due to different localities,
and sequential due to a changing experience from year to year.
Any measurement of quantity involves the use of a standard
which hy definition must he known hy experience. Now any
differences must he expressed in the terms of the standard. The
rating schedule in order to measure quantity must he a standard
and as such must he the same wherever used. It must he made up
of the relative hazards of construction, occupancy, protection
end exposure and must also include the different experiences
in different parts of the country end also the changing experience
from year to year.
The hazards of construction can he covered hy specific
charges as determined hy classification. Now the difference in
experience in different parts of the country and the changing
escperience from year to year are not suhject to any fixed law.
These must he lumped together in one sum which is called the hasis
1. Hess, Philosophy and Methods of Fire Rating - p. 19.
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rate. In one sense these iDase tariffs are a classified analysis
of fire hazard. -Is to foun and method employed in determining
then they should be uniform for the entire country. There is
an ohvious necessity that there he a nationel hasis-^ tariff as
a central standard of comparison in "bringing about unifoimity
of analysis and arrangement, and preserving consistent relations
mong the various state tariffs. In this way only can consistency
be maintained in basis rates, charges, credits, standards of
construction and other hazards in each state tariff with relation
to other state tariffs.
In constructing a basis schedule analysis is made of
certain features of the hazard as detemined by classification
and to each of these is attached a charge, while to the residue
consisting of the unanalyzed parts is attached a luinp charge
known as the basis rate. The difference between the base rate
and the other charges is that the former includes all charges
too obscure, indefinite or unimportant to schedule and which
can not be definitely determined by experience, while the latter
is made up of specific charges based on classification experience.
The only hazard common to all risks is the unanalyzed
haz&rd and therefore the only charge that is found in all risks
is the basis rate.^ The charges for the analyzed hazard are
made in percentages of the base rate and in tins wsy it is possible
to maintain constant end equitable relations between individual
charges and betv;een any individual charge and the base rate.
Thus v/hen there is a difference in the experiences of any two
states, which calls for different estimates in these states,
E. Hess, Philosophy and Methods of Pire Rating - p. 19 and 24
11 Dean, Fire Eating as a Science - p. 89
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this difference can "be made by a ch.unge in the hase rates.
Similar risks then in different states will he charged the s..rne,
hut the hase rates will he different, and this difference in
base rates will express the differences in the loss experiences
of the two states. The great advantage of this form of schedule
ratins is that there is only one change necessary to alter the
rate if experience dictates that such a change is necessary, the
hase rate is changed and yet the same relations will continue
to exist as hefore.
This establishment of relations among hase rates and charges
a
in the several states is/necessity forced on the raters hy state
sovereignty as well as hy the permanent differences found in
climatic and social conditions. A tariff built upon the
principles of relativity may require a period of adjustment in
order to become consistent but when this consistency is once
acquired it becomes a permanent-^ body of relations for the
measurement of the fire hazard.
In theory there is but one average cost for each class but
in' practice fire insurance is not transacted in the United
States but in 48 states each of which insists upon being
treated as an independent soverignty. Perhaps it is a good thing
that state boundaries do exist as these boundaries divide
the country into more or less puonounced geographical areas with
similar characteristics. This enables the establishment of
coexistent relations in haz rd with reference to space areas
having practically the same cnnditions thru basis schedules.
This may be illustrated*^ by the follomng: in Illinois the basis
1. Hess, Philosophy and Methods of E'ire Rating - p. 25
ibid - p. 26
, \
'
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rate for trick "buildings is 60 cents and in Tennessee 85 cents.
This differnece is due to a difference in experience. Any change
in experience can he readily incorporated in the schedule by
simply changing the hase rate.
The more the risk is aaalyzed the less will he the smount
of the unanalyzed lump charge or hasis rate. By reducing this
charge to a minimum the greater does the rate become on ex-
pression of the true relation between the various hazards.
In order to accomplish this, uniform classification is necessaiy.
On January 1, 1915, all of the companies, members of the
national Board of Pire Underwriters, began to classify their risks
on a uniform basis. It is cleexly within the possibilities
of statistical science to determine the relative degrees of hazard
between lighting a building by candle, oil, gas, or electricity,
or heating it by open fireplace, stove, or furnace and it would be
equally possible to determine the same relations with all the
more important construction and exposure hazards provided it
were possible to locate in every case the cause of the fire.
Some underwriters claim that this is practic oCLly impossible be-
cause the origin of fires are often unknowp- The factory mutuals
,
though, have been successful in discovering this origin and have
made every fire teach the companies a lesson. How if they could
find the origin does it not seem reasonable that the stock
companies could do likewise? It seems to the writer that if
every fire weife carefully investigated either by a represerrfc ative
of the company or an inspector from the state fire marshal's office
the cause of many of the fires could be ascertained and also
what is far more import ant, the moral hazard would be greatly re-
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duced. It is not within the scope of an agent.* Is duties to do this
liecause it would cause more or less dissension conong his clients.
He would he looked on as a corporation' s' hireling' and people
would have less faith and confidence in him.
Charges and credits should be hased upon united judgment
and experience. It certainly shows greuter wisdom to adopt
past experience as a hasis of rating than to attempt to fix the
rates by guessing at probabilities. ^Yery underwriter hao his
own specific views in regard to what the relation is between
specific hazards. Even this view is not absolute for if a
number of underwriters are asked what the specific charge for a
certain hazard should be the chances are that no two will agree,
and then if several days ure allowed to elapse and the same
.questions asked again, it is probable that each vdll regard the
hazard differently thsn he did before. It may be fairly assumed
that large errors will be far less frequent and probable than
smaLl ones. Large errors are almost impossible so that the
probability decreases as the emount of error increases. It may
also be taken for grf-inted that positive and negative errors
will be equ^aiy probable and in the final rc.te the error will be
counterbalanced. Under this leveling influence it seems safe to
assume that each charge is automatically regulated within limits
not far from the true mean. These assumptions would be correct
if every risk had the same hazards in common .but it is reasonable
to assume that this method would create preferred classes because
it would only be by a rare stroke of luck that each risk would
have an equ...l amount of positive and negative errors. It is
1, Dean, Fire Rating and Science
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true, however, that the element of favoritism among similar
classes to a certain extent would "be eliminated "because as a
general rule the risks are similar and charges and credits would
be the same.
Another argument against a complex system of classification
is that in rating we are compelled to deal with parts of risks.
It would iiivolve great expense and clerical work to list each
risk according to its deficiencies and then to calculate the
fire loss according to these deficiencies. Charges are established
for deficiencies hy observation, comparison, and conferences.
It is known that a charge for a given factor that is unreasonably
large will not hold against competition. If the charge is un-
reasonably small, experience or common sense will right it.
Fire insurance should profit from the steps now being taken
by the life insurance companies. Until coniparatively recent
times, life insurance was issued only to those who could pass a
creditable medical examination, in other words a standard was
used to which all must conform. Nov/, hwever, this class is
being extended. Statistics are being collected in order that
the companies may determine v/hat effect occupation, laoality,
family histoiy, and personal impairment have on the average life
of the individual. For this reason the Actuarial Society of
America has been formed to combine the experiences of those
companies wishing to write on all classes of lives. A uniform
system of classification is used, the cards are punched in the
separate offices, then they v/ill be united and classified with
the aid of the sorting machine into a great variety of groups.
As a result the com.panies will be in possession of a com.plete
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statistical analysis of the influences of occupation, locality,
family history, and personal impaiiment upon the -length of life
of the individual,
Mr. E. G. Richards, President of the Commonwealth In-
surance Company, rec ommends that a standard form of classification
of the fire hazards of the entire United States be prepared
and that a plan of reporting all risks written in the United
States "be devised such plan to require a report only of the
amounts written with their classification. All losses with
their probahle causes should he reported and then hy classifying
all of these reports a feasible plan for schedule rating founded
upon the classified experience of all the companies would then
be national in scope and could justi:^ general recognition as
a conclusive and scientific system.
Prior to January 1, 1915, all attempts to induce the c cm-
pmies to combine their experience as a basis for making rates
has failed. Th.t the companies keep classifications of their
own is well lmov/n,but the systems are not unifom and could not
be combined even if the companies v/ould allow them to be. They
regard these experiences as a form of trade secret and are very
careful about keeping the public in the dark concerning them.
Perhaps it is fortunate that combined classification was
not begun at the very first for a false start might have brought
the system into disrepute and it is always easier to start anew
thf^n to undo and psitch up a system full of errors. To-day .however,
fire insurance is in a position ¥/hen something must be done.
Many state governments have destroyed the rating function of the
companies and have undertcken to perform this function themselves.
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They coriSider fire insurance companies as cuasi-public servants
and that as such the puhlic has a right to kiaow the cost prices.
There is far less to fear from an honest puhlicity than from the
suspicicfts generated in the public mind hy an ignorance of the
facts. The attitude of the state governments seems to "be
that the companies have been given an opportunity to demonstrate
the equit ableness of their rates, which as a general rule they
have failed to do«
The respective legislatures have been largely to blsme for
this absence of combinations, since they have passed obnoxious
laws against all foms of combinations.
Another reason for uniform classification that is not
so clearly understood is the difference between coexistent
and sequential relations. The latter cannot be charged the
same as a coexistent relation, iixcessive losses of some years
must be spread over all years ^approaching a mean as nearly as
possible. It certainly does not seem equitable that the cost of
large conflagrations should fall on any certain class or at any
specific time. The conflagration hazard is national in scope
and should be spread over a l:.rge number of years. vVhether it
should be bom by all classes is an open question. It is liable
to come at any time, but risks in segreated districts are practical-
ly immune. It seems to be imposing a hardship on the small
to\vn or village to charge it for the conflagration hazard of a
large city. Public welfare demands^ an interacting system of
rating which will distribute the crests of excessive loss waves
so widely over space, and property values that these waves will
l.Dean, Fire Rating as a Science, - id, 97
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lie reduced to enduraMe proportion. If a class has an extremely-
high loss one year it is not just to doahle or triple the rate,
hut to spread this loss over a national class or all classes.
The increase would he so small that the individual would not
notice the rise, yet it would prevent competing companies coming
in or of smsll classes hearing more than a just proportion of
their losbes- ^"^ impracticahle to ohserve state hasis rates
in classes where large values are concentrated in one risk and
few risks in a state. In these cases state lines must not he
considered and a national hasis rate used.
Any system of insurance rating which does not discriminate
hetween safe coiiBtruct ion and unsafe c onstruction ,and hetween
care and negligence is an injury to the community. Schedule
rating should not only determine the rates eqmtahly hut it
also should act as an incentive tov/ard lessening the fire
waste in this coimtry. The reason why rates are increasing is
that the fire waste is increasing. If fire waste could he re-
duced the rates would he lessened. One important way of reducing
the fire waste is allowing a liheral premium for good huilding
coiist ruction. In many instances todj^ it is cheaper to huild
a non-fireproof huilding and insure it than it is to huild
a fire-proof huilding. An insufficient rate causes discriminatiom
in its worst form hecause there is not svLfficient incentive to
cut down the fire wa£;te.
Another reason why the underwriter should he interested in
reducing the fire loss is that premiums are paid in advance
against losses that have not yet occurred. If the loss ratios
could he forced to fall gradually there will always he a
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larger margin of profit in the business, even thov-gh. the rates
are adjusted from time to ti-e to compare favorably v/ith the
loss v/ave.
The underwriter should also hear in mind that the business
is changing, that the interest to-day is coming to lie in fire
prevention and that the most progressive are those who most
clearly see these tendencies. His function .is changing and
in the not too-distent future he will be paid for preventing
for
fires rather than/paying losses.
The purpose of the modern schedule should be to educate
and should be placed in the hsnds of all property owners. They
should know or have a means of finding out the kinds of con-
struction that resist fires to the greatest extent. That this
movement is recognized can be seen in the great work now being
done by the Underwriters' Laboratories of Chicago. iSvery
building should be constructed with the idea of eliminating
draftsi It is possible to construct frame buildings that will
actually resist fire longer than improperly constructed brick
buildings by filling the space between the studs with fire
resisting material, by cutting off all drafts, by using sub-
stantial timbers for posts and beam.s,and wipe lathing.^ Hard
burned brick is the best fire resisting material, stone is
dfoigerous. Iron work should be protected by some kind of in-
combustible material A heavy support of wood is better than
a naked iron column because the latter will collapse in a
great heat while it takes a long time for the wood to burn
through. Cast iron is better than wrought because it is less
susceptible to deterioration due to rust. Pire shutters should
1. Moore, Fire Insurance and Hot? to Bu"3-lcL - y<i«
2. ibid - p. 100
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never "be employed irnless there is an exposure h- zard ,lDe cause
under
they rnsy conceal an internal fire until it gets ^oo strong
a headway to he checked. Special care should be used in
guarding a fireproof huilding against the dangers of an
intemiil fire as when the contents in such a "building once
get on fire it is practically impossible to cheek .the fire.
In large cities where the conflagration hazard is Ic-.rge,
plans should be devised v/hereby on certain streets, only absolutely
fire proof buildings should be constructed, in this way forming
immense fire walls that would check any conflagration that
may start. In constructing these fireproof build-ings every inch
of the exposure surface should fee fire proof. The time has come
when the builder must consult one well versed in fire
protective construction as well as the architect
•
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Chapter III
STATE INTERPSRENCE
No small portion of the adverse legislation in foroe to-
day h.s grov;n out of real or suspected discrimination as to lo-
calities. If a man in one part of the country is rated hy the
same rule as a man in another part he is generally satisifed.
The average ins.n is not so much concerned as to what rate he
has to pay for insurance as he is witli what the other fellow
pays. The legislature of Wisconsin passed the valued policy law
of that state "because the inhabitants had heen humhugged by
"shyster" insurance solicitors. Under this law a company is
conTpelled to pay the face of the policy in case of a total
loss instead of on the value of the property destroyed. As
long as the policy is kept at or below the value of the property
the true principle of insurance, indemnity, is maintained,
but whenever the policy insures the property; for more than the
property is v/orth this fandamental rule is ignored. Insurance
then becomes a gamble with the odds strongly in favor of the in-
sured. The moral hazard is greatly increased and as a rule this
burden must fall on all insured alike, as there is no means
whatever, of estimating its rate and placing it where it belongs.
In V/isconsin the average burning rate increased from 57 to 66 cents
a fev/ years after the valued policy law went into effect. In
other states a similar increase has been noted. That the law
violates one of the fundamentals of insurance has been recognized
by the courts in the const motion that they have placed on
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"total" losses.
Another grave act of some of the state legislatures has heen
their adverse legislation in regard to the coinsurance clause.
The principle on which this is founded - that rates should he
bssed up .n the percentage that the insurance carried hears to the
value of the property - is not only, sound but is absolutely a
requisite if the e>iuities of the insured are to be preserved.
It recognizes that the responsibility for maintaining a given
per centage of the insursjice to the value of the property must
rest with the insured. A large number of the losses are partial
and without coinsurance discrimination is produced in favor of
the man v/ho insures relatively large values for small sums, he
knowing that if he has a loss the chances are in his favor that
it will be small and amply covered at the expense of the one
who carries a relatively high amount of insurance on his property.
In Germany"^ and I'rance this principle has been recognized and
has been made a part of every policy. The injustice of it may
be observed in the following example. A and B have two stocks
of goods each valued at stilO,000. A knowing that most of the
losses are p rtial takes out a policy for ^£000. B takes out
a policy for §8000. A pays a premium of ij^-EO, B ^80. A loss
occurs to both stocks of itiSOOO. A gets his ijpEOOO for which he
has paid only ^#20 and B gets ^iSOGO after he h..s paid out four
times as much. Kow with a coinsurance clause A v/ould only have
gotten iy400 and B §1600. \7hat is needed to prevent this kind
of discrimination is a sliding scale of rates dependent on the
relation between the face of the policy and the value of the
property insured.
1. Zartman, Yale Readings in Insn-rance.

35
Another grave mistake made by practically all state
legislatures is in the matter of taxation. A fair tax similar
to the tax on other corporate undert skings would meet with
approval. At present all companies are taxed a certain percentage
of their gross premium receipts on the theory that this is
necessary in order to pay for their supervision. The fact is that
the tax is far too large, at least in the state of New York and
this state may be tsken as a typical example of other states. In
theory the tax comes out of the profits of the business, whereas
in reality it is paid by the policy holders. The injustice of
this is that the companies are forced to do the collecting and
the man who does not insure escapes this tsx: which should be
borne by all. Then too the agent's commission is inflated by
this additional charge because his commission is calculated on
the gross premium.
Hot many years ago all combinations of insurance companies
were looked upon with public disfavor. The result has evinced
itself in many states by so-called anti-compact laws,"^ These
laws were passed at a time when the public considered all com-
binations of corporate undertaking with distrust. Combinations
among insurance companies can not be considered in the same
light as other canbinations whose chief aim is monopolistic.
The object of combinations among insurance comp^jiies is to prevent
cut throat competition in rate making. There is always more or
!• At the present time the following named states have
some fomm of statute in force forbidding or held to forbid
combinations to fix premium rates - Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Hew Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washiggton and Wisconsin.
2. New York Special by Committee, Report I.
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less competition among the memlDers and as the bonds which
hold them together are not very strong these combinations
as a rule esist only for short periods. The companies realize
that high rates with an enormuus profit will induce new capital
to enter the business and as a rule the old companies seek
to prevent this. Competition among companies for country
business is very keen because they wish to carry this business
in order to offset the risk taken due to the conflagration
hazards in Ir-rge cities. There is ,glso keen competition be-
tween the various board and non-board companies and with the
mutual s and Lloyds.
In the eastern states companies have been allowed to com-
bine in order to keep rates unifoim. In some of the middle
west states legislation has prohibited all forms of organizations
of the companies to adjust rates. In others the agents of the
home companies are permitted to make rates by conferences with
each other, the foreign companies being compelled to abide by
these. Other states allow the local agents to make the rates.
In California the rates are made by the companies with no
state interference.
The main tendency of anti-compact laws has been to break
down the forces of beneficial action caused by schedule rating.
While the rating is done by schedule, there is no such clear-
cut relation between the hazard and the rate. The rates are
estimates rather than relations, and while they are generally
adhered to ,there is just enough dissociation of the rate-making
and the rate-getting to Y/eaken decidedly the good effects of
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the system of schedule rating upon fire protection.
The most important single event in the fire insurance
world for some years was in the decision handed down by the
1
Federal Supreme Court in German Alliance vs. Kansas case.
Under the Kansas Rating law every fire insurance company is
compelled to file with the state g'Jiperintendent of Insurance
general "basis schedules showing the rates on all risks insur-
able by such company in the state, and all the conditions
which affect the rates or the value of the insurance to the
assured. When any such rate is excessive or not adequate for
the safety or soundness of the company, the superintendent is
authorized to direct the company to fix a higher or lov;er
rate, dependent on the risk. Rebating and discrimination are
also forbidden. The act does not give the superintendent supreme
authority, but provides that any order or notice of regulation
made by him may be the subject of an iction in any district
court of the state to have the order or regulation vacated.
The company contended that fire insurance was a private
business and that the superintendent did not have authority
to fix the rates at which insurance must be sold.
The court maintained that the underlying principle in
the case was that business of certain kinds holds such
a peculiar relation to the public interest thst it becomes
subject to the right of public regulation. It then proceeded
to show that the business of insurance was of vast importance,
and that a l^rge part of the country's wealth, subject to loss
thmugh fire, is protected ty it; that its effect is to create
1.59th Massachusetts Fire and Marine Insurance Report.

38
a fund of assurance and credit 7/hich becanes an asset or a
basis of credit to the insured, thus heing practically a necessity
to "business activity and enterprise, and therefore essentially
different from ordinary commercial transactions. It comes, the
court held, within the scope of the principle that a business
may he so affected by the publ c interest as to warrant regu-
lation and become subject to be controlled by the public for
c onmon
the/good. The opinion sets forth what has been done by the
various states in the way of regulating insurance companies
and the transactions of insurance business, and held that the
liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States is no more intimately involved in price regulation
than in the other foms of regulation as to the validity of
which there is no dispute. It swept aside all the arguments
and precedents for considering that business to be a private
business in respect to which the public has not the right to
receive and demand service, and all the other contentions that
the fixing of rates by the state is taking private property
for private use, and rested on the broad ground that insurance
so affects the public welfare as to make it proper for the
state to regulate the price at which it may be sold, which
regulation is only in line with what the states have been doing
for many years. Three of the justices of the court dissented
from the majority opinion.
It is interesting to observe how the present tendency
of the principle of state regulation is opposed to the prin-
ciple of anti-compact laws. Under the latter premeditated and
enforced uniformity of rates was prohibited while under state
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regulation the effect is to secure alDSolute c onformity. The
^nti-compact law in fact made "bargaining iDOSSible and this is
directly opposed to equitahleness because of the gross dis-
crimination. By the United States Supreme Court allowing the
state to regulate the rates there is great danger that the
power taken from the companies will "be used for political
purposes. The state has no classification tahles and
even if they did have the application would require the work
of experts. The situation would have to he very aggravated that
would warrant the state in assuming such an extended and tech-
nical piece of work. Then too the size of the state is not
sufficient. Insurance is hased on general average and no
one locality is large enough to compute averages on. If rate-
making were lodged with the state, and if the experience of
that state were favorable, the tendency naturally would "be to
make the rates from that experience. Uow the most serious
effect of this would he that in case of a large conflagration
it would he impossible for a company to recoup itself; for if
each state stood on its own experience it would refuse to
permit a rise in rates caused by some outside loss, the result
being that the state in which the conflagration occurred would
have to pay the entire loss. An actual example of this occurred
when the state of Wisconsin! refused to allow the rates in the
state to be increased following the San i'rancisco disaster and
as a result Wisconsin escaped paying her just share of the con-
flagration rate.
Prior to 1909 rates in Texas were anything but fair and
just. Many of the largest property owners and insurers in
1. New York Special Legislative Report 1911.
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the state, particularly in the larger towns and cities, exacted
and obtained from the insurance ccmpanies certain special
privileges in the way of rebates and lower insurance rates,
which were never accorded or allowed to the small property
owners. As a result of these conditions the Pire Rating Board
Law was passed in April 1909 and later amended. This law was
the result of an appeal on the part of the Local Agents'
Association for relief from the intolerable conditions wrought
by unscrupulous competition. This law, though' it is not
perfect does, however, preclude discrimination and mokes the
rate on similar classes of property the same*
The heretofore favored classes have aroused some agitation
against the schedule system of rating, largely it is believed
because their rates have been increased. The Board has
collected data on the relation of the fire loss to the premiums
received for the period 1909-1912 .und has found that the losses
plus the expenses have far exceeded the income of the companies.
The Board is working in close touch with, and have drawn
largely upon the experience of the National Board of Fire
Underwriters and the National Fire Protective Associations.
The Board thus seems to be striking at the root of the cause of
an excessive fire waste and consequent high rates,by standardiz-
ing every important elementary feature of hazard in construct-
ion, materials and occupancies and investigating every tangible
feature of fire hazard ."^
In Missouri there has been much public complaint as to
1, 57th Annual Report of Commissioner of Insurance
and Batiliing, Texas.
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the rates charged for fire insurance and the method "by which
they have "been fixed. Anti-trust statutes were passed in 1895
and were expressly applicahle to fire insurance companies
who used the same rates. Notwithstanding this lav/, rating
hureaus were maintained throughout the period for the purpose
of furnishing what was termed "estimates," which consisted
of specific rates on each risk in the state.
This method of fixing rates in so far as the comp.:jiies
were concerned prevailed in practically all of the states,
the companies contending that it was the only practicahle and
Bconomical manner in which the rating could he done.
In 1911 the legislature enacted what is commonly known
as the Oliver law. This act provided that every fire insurance
Company operating in Missouri should within thirty days file
with the Insurance Superintendent general hasis schedules
shovang all charges and credits which in any wise affected rates,
and should within ninety days file specific rates for each
risk or class of risks derived from its general hasis schedules
for each city, town and village in the State.
The act further authorized the Superintendent of Insurance,
upon complaint heing made that any rates or schedules so
filed were unreasonahle
,
unjust and discriminating, to malie an
investigation and determine what rates would he reason&hle and
just.
On the 9th of Decemher 1912 the companies through an
actuarial hureau, having prepared the survey of risks, offered
to file with the Insurance I>epartment the specific rates de-
rived from such surveys, hut these the Superintendent rejected
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on the ground that the "basis schedules and specifio rates
derived therefrom were unjust, unreasonahle and discriraiiiating.
This was followed by much confusion and uncertainty as to
what constituted the lawful rate in the state. The companies
contended that the rates they offered to file were the only
rates at which property could he carried, while the Superintend-
ent insisted that such rates were unlawful, and that until he
officially accepted same, rates should he fixed as under the
former law.
Agents were instructed by the companies that these rates
7/ere mandatory and must be adhered to and these instru-ctions
were generally observed and carried out.
In most cases the new rates v/ere higher than those
previously charged. As a result the Legislature repealed the
rating law and re-enacted the old anti-trust act, vdth an
additional declaratory section.
At this action most of the foreign companies went into
open rebellion. On April 30, 1912 they withdrev/ from the state.
The companies contended that tl.e legal effect of the latter
statute was to preclude them from using and being governed
by estimates prepared by rating bureaus or from directly or in-
directly fixing rates through joiht agencies, and therefore they
could not safely and successfully operate here.
Governor Major, Superintendent Revelle and the Attorney-
General publicly declared that the fears of the companies were
without foundation and that the anit-compact statute v/hen reason-
ably construed in accordance with the manifest legislative
intent, did not prevent cmy compjiny from sucoessfiilly operating
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thereunder or from applying to their husiness recognized
principles and practices.
After a suspension of ahout three months the companies
resumed business,"^
The Legislature of 1915 passed a new rating law. Under
this law the insurance companies are compelled to maintain
a public racing record from which the premium rate, applicable
to each risk may be ascertained. The records are always
open to public inspection. The companies cannot raise the
rates without the approval of the Superintendent of Insurance,
and if he refuses to approve a proposed rate increase the
burden of proof is upon the companies to show that the increased
re.tes are reasonable. Unlawful di scrir/iination in rates is
punishable by fine or imprisonment. Each agent is recjuired
to write upon the back of the policy the various charges making
up the total rate, thus calling the assured' s attention to
any extra hazards.
In trying to find out wh^y the public as a rule seem so
hostile towards insurance companies it becomes important to
examine the earnings of the companies. The following data
was compiled by J. H. Woodward, Head of the Auditing Bureau
of the He?/ York Department of Insurance.
Taking the six largest companies in the United States at
random for a period since 1890-1910 the average earnings
were 10. 1^^. The dividends have averaged 5.4^^ that means
that they have distributed a little more than half their
earnings in dividends and kept the remainder in the business
1. 44th and 45th Annual Reports of the Missouri Superintend-
ent of Insurance.
2. Spectator March 22, 1915.
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where it has gone mostly to increase the surplus and is thus
at the risk of a conflagration.
Six medium sized compaiiies chosen at random have shovm
an average earning rate of 6,6% half of which has "been paid
out in dividends the "balance remaining in. the business.
Six of the smallest companies have shown an average
earning rate of 4.5%, dividands 3.45^.
Of six new companies from 5-10 years old, three have lost
money.
Of six hrenches of foreign companies three have lost money."*"
These average earnings show that what money has been made
in the fire insurance business has been made by the old
established companies and that new companies are just as
likely to lose as to ma3^:e money. The prosperity of a compajoy
corresponds quite closely to its size and standing. On the
whole, companies have not made &n excessive profit. It should
be kept in mind that a fire insurance company may lose everything
in one conflagration. Bo company of the first ra&k has gained
a footing in the business during the last thirty years. Of the
213 companies licensed to do business in the state of Kev;
York in 1875 only 69 remain the bi.l£ince 144 having v;ithdrawn
and in nearly every case gone out of business.
As a general rule fire insurance companies are not being
organized by men familiar with financial conditons, it is
next to impossible to secure financial backing in Wall Street
sufficient to organize companies. By far the larger part of the
1. New York Special Legislative Report 1911.
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money now invested in this form of corporate rnidert diking
"belongs to small investors*
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided thct
it is within the power of the individual states to regulate
rates. The success of state rate-making depends on 7/hether
the states will recognize (1) the individual features of
a risk, such as construction, occupancy, fire protection,
and exposure, (2) different loss experience in different
locslities regardless of state lines, and (3) a changing loss
experience in all localities from year to year. Reasonahle
equity can only he maintained hy a proper consideration of
the ahove points and it is this equity that the states should
seek to secure.
One point, however, that the state officials must "bear
in mind if they assume the rating function, is that there is
no way of compelling the fire insurance companies to v/rite
insurance upon any risk ?;hich the companies are not willing to
accept. If the rates dictated hy the state are too low the
companies will decline the h-uSiness and there is no w;jy of
forcing the companies to accept it. The capital of the in-
surance companies is in a very licuid form c>nd it would he
very difficult for the stjtes, if not impossible, to seize
it and force the companies to do the states' bidding.
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